THE ATHENIAN LAND FRONTIER 404-322 B.C.
Given the geographical realities of the Athenian borders (mountainous, difficult to cross except by established routes), the logistics of classical Greek armies (large baggage-trains required staying on established routes through difficult terrain), and the general inferior level of poliorcetics among classical Greek armies, the policy of defending the borderlands was a feasible and reasoned response.4 Consequently, the strategy of border defense was preferred by most (not all) fourth-century Athenian writers on military theory (FA ch. 4), and was the system ultimately adopted by the Athenian state.
The system worked quite well: Attica was not invaded in force (the raid of Sphodrias in 378 was not in force) between 403 and 322 B.C. The success of the border-defense system in deterring potential invaders meant that no great battles were fought in Athens' borderlands and thus the fortification system was not very interesting to ancient historians. The most prolific political orator of the age, Demosthenes, preferred a different strategic approach to state defense. The literary evidence for the fortification system is therefore meager and the traces of Athens' land defenses must be reconstructed by studying institutional changes and archaeological record.
Institutional modifications that can plausibly be linked to the border defenses include the appointment of a general "of the countryside," reforms of the ephebic system and infantry recruitment, establishment of highwaybuilder as a magistracy, and various changes in military financing (FA ch. 5). The archaeological record reveals evidence of early-to mid-fourth-century construction (and reconstruction) of several major border fortresses and a network of signal towers (FA ch. 7). Roads, which cannot be securely dated, link the city with the borderlands (FA ch. 8).
The book concludes with (1) a hypothetical reconstruction of how the defense system might have worked in practice against an invader, and (2) a tentative chronology for the institutional reforms and the building program that together constituted what I take to have been a coherent system of border defenses. I speculated that due to diplomatic and financial constraints the system was not finally completed until mid-century, and that shortly thereafter it became obsolete due to advances in Macedonian poliorcetics and artillery technology. I also suggested that emphasis on the border defense system helps to explain why the Athenians did not send their full infantry levy against Philip of Macedon until 338 B.C. (FA chs. 9-10).
All of these conclusions are, of course, subject to being emended or rejected outright. They are based on my own interpretation of a lacunary literary and archaeological record. Ongoing work on Attic border sites should 4For logistics and routes see FA ch. 6; poliorcetics: FA 43-45. I discuss these matters further in "Hoplites and Obstacles," in Victor Hanson, ed., Ancient Greek Battle (London, forthcoming).
help to clarify the chronology of individual fortifications, but scholarly unanimity on how the forts, towers, and so on, relate to one another is still a long way off. Fortress Attica is neither the last word on Athens' land defenses, nor a comprehensive discussion of Athens' overall foreign/military/defense policy, but it does attempt to demonstrate that military history can be incorporated into a broader context of social, economic, and ideological history. It seeks to show as well that a close study of unexcavated archaeological remains can add to discussions of Greek history.5 Finally, it was meant as a modest contribution to a growing body of "revisionist" studies that reject the traditional characterization of fourth-century Athens as a polis beset by anomie and moral/civic decline.6 My aim was to demonstrate how the Athenians devised a rational and effective (if ultimately imperfect) response to their changed post-war circumstances (especially the loss of the empire). This demonstration undermines the old argument that the Athenians lost at Chaeronea because they had become degenerates.
How surprising to read in Harding's article that I had argued just the opposite! In his introductory paragraph Harding (61) Therefore, since Attica could only produce annually about as much grain as was imported from this region the effort to guard Attic-grown grain logically should have been "commensurate with the effort made to guard the sea route from the Bosphorus" (FA 27).8
Writing a book is, of course, necessarily a process of selection, exclusion, and emphasis. I would applaud the appearance of a general treatment of fourth-century Athenian foreign/military/defense policy that would put border defense into a broader perspective. Indeed, I hope that my much more narrowly focused monograph will pave the way for such a work. Perhaps a synoptic study will show that border defense loomed less large in Athenian thought and planning than I supposed. But meanwhile, it is surely perverse for a reviewer to attack an author for not having written the book of the reviewer's dreams.
Unfortunately, Harding also garbles specific arguments made in Fortress Attica; here I will document only two examples. 
